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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Levon Fred Cordingley appeals from the district court's order affirming the
magistrate court's denial of his motion to dismiss.

Statement of Facts and Course of the Proceedings
The facts and course of proceedings relating to this appeal are as set
forth by the district court in its memorandum decision and order affirming the
magistrate's denial of Cordingley's motion to dismiss:
On February 23, 2008, Boise City Police Officer Stace
arrested Cordingley after finding him in possession of marijuana
and marijuana paraphernalia. Cordingley was cited for violating
I.C. §§ 37-2732(c) (3) and 37-2734A.
Cordingley later filed a motion to dismiss the charges on
August 28, 2008 arguing that his actions are protected by I.C. § 73402 because he was freely exercising his religious beliefs by
possessing marijuana and drug paraphernalia. During a hearing on
the motion, Cordingley admitted that he was in possession of
marijuana but claimed that he was carrying it as a sacrament for
the Church of Cognitive Therapy. This church, which Cordingley
created, is "designed specifically for the use of entheogenic
sacraments to help us get in touch with our spiritual self, in order to
obtain enlightenment." The sacrament that is vital and mandatory
to the practices of this church is cannabis, otherwise known as
marijuana. Cannabis is used as a spiritual enhancer and for the
purpose of becoming a better person inside, comforting the sick
and afflicted, and changing negatives into positives. People of all
different religions join this church because it is a companion to
religion to help people get in contact with themselves, others, and
the universe in a spiritual way. The church is multi-denominational,
as it recognizes all faiths; and it does not require a belief in God
thought it does encourage the use of cannabis as a sacrament to
get closer to the creator or the universe.
The magistrate issued an order denying the motion on
October 29, 2008 for the reason that Cordingley failed to meet his
burden of establishing that he was engaged in any religious

1

practice protected by I.C. § 73-402 at the time of his arrest. Then
in a memorandum opinion issued on January 29, 2009, the
magistrate further explained that to seek the protection of I.C. § 73402, Cordingley must establish that the contested government
action substantially burdens a religious belief which is sincerely
held by Cordingley. After examining the evidence presented, the
magistrate acknowledged that Cordingley's beliefs are sincerely
held and substantially burdened but found that the beliefs are not
religious beliefs which are protected by law.
Cordingley then entered a conditional guilty plea. He filed a
timely appeal of the magistrate's order and his sentence was
stayed pending the appeal.
(R., pp.146-148 (footnote omitted).}
The district court, in affirming the magistrate's ruling, concluded the
evidence failed to establish that Cordingley's Church of Cognitive Therapy is a
religion as envisioned by I.C. § 73-402:
Cordingley acknowledged that the Church of Cognitive Therapy is
not so much a religion as it is a companion to a religion. In reality,
this church presents an ideology or philosophical belief as to how
people can become spiritual or enlightened, but it does not have a
comprehensive believe system with the trappings of a religion.
There is no evidence that the church provides a belief system with
answers to the problems and concerns that confront human beings
or that it provides answers to questions about life, purpose, or
death. The church does not promote a moral code or rely on any
one set of teachings. Instead, the church provides a sacrament
that is to be used as an accompaniment to other religious beliefs.
(R., pp.151-152.)
The district court originally filed its memorandum decision and order May
5, 2012 (R., pp.146-156) and Cordingley filed a notice of appeal on June 17,
2012 (R., pp.154-156.)

The court then re-entered its order affirming the

magistrate court's denial of Cordingley's motion to dismiss December 2, 2011.
(R., pp.182-183.) Cordingley timely appeals from that order. (R., pp.184-187.)
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ISSUE
Cordingley states the issue on appeal as:
Did The District Court Err When the Court Affirmed the
Magistrate's Decision Denying Mr. Cordingly's [sic] Motion To
Dismiss Based Upon Idaho Code § 73-402 (FERPA)?
(Appellant's brief, p.g.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Cordingley failed to show that the district court erred in affirming the
magistrate's order denying his motion to dismiss?
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ARGUMENT
Cordingley Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred In Affirming
The Magistrate's Denial Of His Motion To Dismiss
A.

Introduction
Cordingley asserts on appeal the magistrate and district courts were

"greatly confused by the difference between the church [which Cordingley is a
member of] and a religion."
marijuana,

he

claims,

(Appellant's brief, p.23.)

cannot be separated

(Appellant's brief, p.24.)

from

Cordingley's smoking
his religious

beliefs.

Cordingley argues the denial of his motion to dismiss

was in error because there was "no support in the record for the finding that [he]
was not engaged in the free exercise of his religion" and such a denial of his
ability to smoke marijuana is a denial of his "free exercise of his religious belief."
(Appellant's brief, p.24.)
Cordingley's arguments are without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711,184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008». The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." lQ."
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if
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the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s]
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure."

Js!.

(citing Losser, 145

Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137
(1981 )).

C.

The District Court Correctly Affirmed The Magistrate Court's Order
Denying Cordingley's Motion To Dismiss
Cordingley is not entitled to the protection of I.C. § 73-402(3) as he claims

because his use of marijuana does not constitute the "exercise of religion." The
applicable portion of the FERPA, I.C. §§ 73-401, et. seq., is as follows:
73-402. Free exercise of religion protected.
(1) Free exercise of religion is a fundamental right that applies in
this state, even if laws, rules or other government actions are
facially neutral.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, government
shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if
the burden results from a rule of general applicability.
(3) Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person is both:
(a) Essential to further a compelling government interest;
(b) The least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.

(5) In this section, the term "substantially burden" is intended solely
to ensure that this chapter is not triggered by trivial, technical, or de
minimis infractions.
The FERPA offers guidance in the form of definitions in § 73-401:
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(1) "Demonstrates" means meet the burdens of going forward with
evidence, and persuasion under the standard of clear and
convincing evidence.
(2) "Exercise of religion" means the ability to act or refusal to act in
a manner substantially motivated by a religious belief, whether or
not the exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of
religious belief.

(5) "Substantially burden" means to inhibit or curtail religiously
motivated practices.
The Idaho Court of Appeals was recently presented with the question of
an individual's right to the free exercise of religion through the possession of
marijuana in State v. White, 152 Idaho 361, 271 P.3d 1217 (Ct. App. 2011).
When claiming a violation of FERPA, an individual "must carry the burden of
showing that Idaho's controlled substance statutes substantially burden his
exercise of religion." White, 152 Idaho at _ , 271 P.3d at 1221. The Court's
inquiry on appeal is as follows:
Thus, while the issue of whether a belief motivating a particular
practice is "religious" is a question of law, the question of what
compromises a substantial motivation behind a defendant's
conduct, i.e., whether the defendant is motivated by religious (as
encompassed by the FERPA) or secular purposes, is a question of
fact-to which we defer to the lower court unless its finding is
clearly erroneous.
White, 152 Idaho at _ , 271 P.3d at 1221 (citations omitted). The proper test in
this inquiry is the religious motivation test, which requires a claimant to
"demonstrate that religion principally motivated the activity in question." White,
152 Idaho at

_ , 271 P.3d at 1221, n.3 (citations omitted).

Courts must

determine if an individual is sincere in their "religious objection to a government
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policy," and are not "forced to accept the individual's assertion [of motivation]
without further inquiry."

kl

On appeal, Cordingley asserts that "[b]ecause [his] membership is with a
legally-recognized church [the Church of Cognitive Therapy], his right to utilize
the sacrament [by smoking marijuana] is protected as a fundamental part of his
exercise of his religious freedom."

(Appellant's brief, p,22.)

Additionally, he

claims that because his religion, Rastafarianism, has been recognized by the
Ninth Circuit as using marijuana as sacrament, "his free exercise of the right to
use the sacrament cannot be seriously challenged in this case." (ld.) As the
Court of Appeals in White pointed out, however, just because an individual "has
claimed that his impetus for smoking marijuana is religious, does not make it so
for the purposes of the FERPA."

152 Idaho at _ , 271 P.3d at 1225. "To

establish a free exercise defense, a defendant must show first that his religion is
bona fide, and, by extension, that his conduct is actually motivated by statutorilyrecognized religious beliefs."

White, 152 Idaho at _ , 271 P.3d at 1225

(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Here, although Cordingley claims to have been "ordained in 1997 in Taos,
New Mexico, by a Rastafarian Youth Group" (Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.10, L.2), he
identifies himself as "a Christian" (Tr., p.23, Ls.16).
founding father of his own ministry:

He also claims to be the

the COTC Ministry or the Church of

Cognitive Therapy, "which is taking negatives and changing them into positives
with the use of entheogenic sacraments." (Tr., p.10, LsA-S.) As is his practice
as a minister in the COTC, Cordingley routinely carries marijuana and
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paraphernalia for ingesting marijuana because he uses it "to help heal people
with certain mental, physical, and spiritual needs." (Tr., p.9, Ls.12-15.) Although
generally always prepared to offer marijuana in the form of a "sacrament" to
homeless, angry, or confused people it the form of "comfort" (Tr., pA5, Ls.2-11),
Cordingley concedes that he generally does not offer marijuana to such
individuals on the street or sidewalk but does so in private to avoid arrest (Tr.,
pp.25-28).

Cordingley equates the COCT with a spirituality that enhances his

belief of the Christian religion and the religious or non-religious beliefs of others
through smoking marijuana in the form of a sacrament. (Tr., p.29, LA - p.30,
L.24.) The COCT is "a spiritual community where many different people belong
to and different people that use cannabis as a religion." (Tr., p.30, L.25 - p.31,
L.3.) Cordingley seems to have started the Church of Cognitive Therapy strictly
as a means to smoke marijuana while avoiding legal repercussion:
Q:
And has your use of the sacrament evolved over time or has
it been - was it a stated practice and use prior to your coming into
this?

A:

It evolved over time. There was a point when I did use it like
most people - recreational. I probably - we don't promote abuse,
but we promote use.

There was a point in time when I did abuse it, and I had a
spiritual experience which changed my life. But at that point, I no
longer abused it and I began to use it in a spiritual and religious
way.
(Tr., p.50, Ls.1-10.) Cordingley developed what he terms a ministry in order to
smoke marijuana in the name of spirituality.
The magistrate court denied Cording ley's motion to dismiss finding the
COCT "is a community within with an emphasis on spirituality, rather than an
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emphasis on any particular religious beliefs."

(R., p.67.)

The goal is

enlightenment and "can be had by Catholics, Jews, and even atheists."

(Id.)

Ultimately, the only "connecting fiber among the various members is their use of
marijuana" to help in the pursuit of enlightenment.

(Id.)

In affirming the

magistrate's denial of Cordingley's motion to dismiss, the district court
concluded:
Based on the language of the statute, the magistrate did not
err in concluding that Cordingley bears the burden of establishing
that he was exercising religious beliefs protected by I.C. § 73-402
before the burden shifts to the State. Additionally, the magistrate
did not err in obtaining guidance from the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals as to what the court should consider in determining
whether the defendant has met that burden. Although it may be
true that the courts should not be put in the position of deciding
whether a belief amounts to a religious belief, that is the position
Idaho courts are put in by the statute, and the Tenth Circuit case is
a well-reasoned decision that provides guidance in an area where
Idaho case law is silent.
Not only did the magistrate correctly determine the law, but
the magistrate based this decision to deny Cordingley's motion on
sUbstantial evidence. Cordingley acknowledged that the Church of
Cognitive Therapy is not so much a religion as it is a companion to
religion.
In reality, this church presents an ideology or
philosophical belief as to how people can become spiritual or
enlightened, but it does not have a comprehensive belief system
with the trappings of a religion. There is no evidence that the
church provides a belief system with answers to the problems and
concerns that confront human beings or that it provides answers to
questions about life, purpose, or death. The church does not
promote a moral code or rely on anyone set of teachings. Instead,
the church provides a sacrament that is to be used as an
accompaniment to other religious beliefs.
(R., pp.151-152.)
The record contains substantial and competent evidence to support the
magistrate's conclusion that Cordingley's use of marijuana is not substantially
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motivated by a religious belief.

The denial of Cordingley's claim should be

upheld on the basis that he failed to demonstrate that his use of marijuana was
part of the free exercise of religion -- therefore, his marijuana use is not entitled
to the protections of I.C. § 73-402(3).
Even assuming Cordingley's use of marijuana constitutes the free
exercise of religion which has been substantially burdened, the magistrate court
decision should be upheld because, under I.C. § 73-402(3), the state has a
compelling governmental interest in prohibiting such conduct, I.C. § 73-402(3)(a),
and has adopted the least restrictive means of furthering that interest, I.C. § 73402(3)(b).

Cordingley has conceded that "one could surmise that cannabis is

dangerous or that it leads to drinking alcohol, criminal behavior, drug use, or
other

well

established

dangerous

activities[.]"

(Appellant's

brief,

p.25.)

The courts below did not reach the issue of whether the state used the least
restrictive means to further its compelling interest of regulating the use of
marijuana.

However, a conclusion that the state did use the least restrictive

means is justified. Although Cordingley asserted that his use of marijuana was
religious, he did not provide specific locations, time frames, or any other
limitation for such alleged religious practice to take place, other than to provide
comfort for people in need. Moreover, it would be more than problematic to try
to monitor marijuana used by Cordingley where he has no set time, place or
manner in which he uses or administers it. It is difficult to conceive how a less
restrictive law could have been tailored to reasonably fit any supposed religious
use of marijuana by Cording ley. Therefore, nothing but a law totally prohibiting
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the possession of marijuana or paraphernalia is appropriate or adequate to
further

the

state's

interest

in

regulating

the

use

of

marijuana.

Cordingley has failed to demonstrate error in the denial of his motion to dismiss
based on FERPA.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the magistrate court's
denial of Cording ley's motion to dismiss.
DATED this 5th day of October 201

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 5th day of October 2012, I caused two
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